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This paper investigates the effect of the war on the South
Vietnamese economy for the period 1957-1967. For this purpose the
economy is divided into five independent sectors: the war effort, the
agricultural output, the industrial output, the transportation capacity,
and government non-defense expenditures. Each of these sectors is
expressed as a linear function of specific political and economic vari-
ables of interest and a multiple stepwise regression analysis performed
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The purpose of the study reported in this thesis was to examine
the effects of specific political and economic variables on the economy
of South Vietnam for the period 1957 through 1967. For this purpose
a model of the South Vietnamese economy was developed in which the
economy is represented by five independent sectors: the war effort,
agriculture, industry, transportation, and government non-defense
services.
In particular, each sector is expressed as a linear function of
specific political and economic variables. The single variable repre-
senting the political stability was obtained by assigning a numerical
value to political events and taking the annual algebraic summation of
these values as representative of the political stability of South Vietnam.
Each of the economic sectors and the remaining economic variables were
represented by annual values obtained from recorded statistics.
To analyze the effect of these political and economic variables
on the individual economic sectors, the technique of stepwise multiple
regression was used for the eleven years of interest. This analysis was
performed on a computer and allowed the computer to select the variables
to be included in the regression using a decision rule based on the
degree of correlation between the independent and dependent variables.
The results of the analysis for this model indicate that the indus-
trial, transportation, war effort, and government non-defense services

sectors of the South Vietnamese economy have been significantly
affected by the war. Only the agricultural sector appears to have
remained virtually unaffected by the war during the years 1957 through
1967. In particular, these results suggest the large scale dependence
of the Vietnamese economy on the military conflict and presence of the
United States in Southeast Asia.

H. INTRODUCTION
Vietnam has become more than a small country in Southeast Asia.
The events of the past decade have made Vietnam a symbol of a new
kind of American involvement in world affairs and a focus for divisions
in American society. Numerous articles and books have appeared
analyzing the war and the political and military strategies of the parti-
cipants, yet, one issue has received scant notice. Relatively few
people have shown interest in the effects of the events of the past
decade on the South Vietnamese economy. However, the effect of the
war and other political and economic factors on the economy is of para-
mount concern to the future of Vietnam and the future policies and influ-
ence of the United States in Southeast Asia.
Recognizing the importance of these factors on the economy, this
paper examines the economy of South Vietnam for the period 1957 through
1967 to determine the existence of any statistically significant linear
relationships between specific political and economic variables and
individual economic sectors.
Initially, in Chapter III, the paper traces the historical antece-
dents for the period 1957 through 1967 and the rationale and objectives
of the participants in the Vietnam conflict. A brief description of the
Lilienthal, D. E. , "Postwar Development in Vietnam," Foreign
Affairs, v. 47, p. 321-333, January, 1969.

South Vietnamese economy as it existed in the years immediately
following the partition of the country and the economic characteristics
and development during the years 1957 through 1967 are described in
Chapter IV. Chapters V and VI proceed with the rationale used in
constructing the mathematical model of the economy and the method of
analysis used to obtain the results and conclusions contained in
Chapters VII and VIII respectively. Chapter VIII also presents
suggested extensions for investigating the effect of the war on the
South Vietnamese economy and requirements for future research in this




As evidenced by the events of the past five years, Vietnam is
unquestionably the transcendent problem that confronts the United States.
Although troop commitment on the part of the United States has decreased,
the United States is still inexorably embroiled in Southeast Asia and is
finding it extremely difficult to withdraw from this complex engagement.
To obtain a clear understanding of the complexities associated
with the Vietnam conflict, it is necessary to examine the beliefs and
objectives of the war's participants.
The Communist objective in South Vietnam throughout the course of
the war has been and remains the overthrow of any western dominated
government in Saigon. The Communist proclaimed justifications for their
actions can be reduced to three basic reasons:
(1) the artificial division of the country at the
17th Parallel was from a Communist view
legally and morally invalid after 1956
(2) the Communist led war for independence was
supported by a large majority of the people
(3) the Communist led Vietnamese won that war
for independence
.
It is true that the division of Vietnam has its only legal basis in the
Geneva Conference of 1954, and at that conference it was explicitly
2
White, R. K. , "Misperception and the Vietnam War," Journal
of Social Issues , v. 22, p. 31-36, July, 1966.
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agreed that the division of the country would last only two years. In
fact, the Communist-led Viet Minh stopped fighting on the basis of
what seemed to be a firm agreement that there would be an all-
Vietnamese vote in 1956 (which they fully expected to win) that would
unify the country, establishing both unity and full independence without
further bloodshed. Unfortunately, in 1956 Ngo Diem refused to permit
these elections that had been provided for by the Geneva Agreement.
With Diem's decision not to press for a plebiscite under international
supervision even in "his own" southern half of the country, he for-
feited — at least in Communist eyes — not only all claim to the kind of
legitimacy that genuine popular endorsement would have provided, but
also claim to invoke the Geneva Conference's endorsement of the 17th
Parallel as a basis for his own rule in the South. Furthermore, the
Communists claim that in the years between 1950 and 1954, when the
United States was supplying money and arms on a large scale to the
French, the French were fighting against a clear majority of the
Vietnamese people. It is difficult to escape the conclusion from a
Communist viewpoint that the United States was committing agression
in Vietnam from 1950 to 1954. The United States was financing the use
of force on land that did not "belong" to them — or to the French — by
any criterion that they would now accept, and they were doing it against
what now clearly seems to have been a majority of the Vietnamese people.
Lastly, the Vietnamese Communists and the many non-Communists who
had fought with them had every reason to feel in 1954 that the prize for
12

which they had struggled and sacrificed through nine years of war was
finally theirs: a unified, independent country. When Diem blandly
claimed that he was not bound by the decisions at Geneva, a full half
of the prize the Communists felt they had fairly won was snatched from
them.
At the time of the initial large scale United States personnel
commitment to South Vietnam, it was apparent that United States policy
was solely concerned with intervention to help a new and small nation
resist subjugation by a neighboring country — a neighboring country,
incidentally, which was being assisted by the resources of the world's
two largest Communist powers. Reason dictated that the fate averted
in Korea through American and United Nations military force would over-
take the independent countries of Asia, albeit in somewhat subtler
form, were the United States to stand aside while the Communist North
sponsored subversion and terrorism in South Vietnam. At this point it
can be logically accepted that the goals of the United States in thwarting
the "domino theory" were largely in accord with the expressed desire of
the recognized South Vietnamese government. South Vietnam was in
jeopardy of being taken over by Communist forces and welcomed the
substantial increase of men and material that occurred in 1965. With
this substantial commitment, the optimism of both United States and
South Vietnamese military and government officials with regard to the
conduct of the war, together with the encouragement of other Asian allies,
confirmed the United States' belief in the correctness of their policy.
13

However, as the war progressed with escalation on both sides and
a seeming lack of a clear cut plan for military victory, it became readily
apparent in late 1967 that the Asian allies of South Vietnam and the
United States had lost considerable interest in the war in South Vietnam.
Attempts by the United States to prod greater commitment from their
allies produced dismal results. Furthermore, the bombing of North
Vietnam and increased United States' troop and supply commitment had
produced only greater escalation and placed a greater burden on the
United States in terms of man and dollar commitment. This "reaction"
or "hawk" policy of the participants in the conflict, where escalation
provoked greater escalation, can be easily demonstrated by means of
simple linear functions that approximate the behavior of both South
3
Vietnam and the allies and North Vietnam. Letting the following
represent the war effort of South Vietnam:
(1) WE = we + r WE
sv sv sv nv
where
WE = the war effort of South Vietnam and the
sv
allies in terms of committed manpower
we = the minimal amount of South Vietnamese
sv
and allied war effort provided, regardless
of other variables
r = the reaction coefficient of South Vietnam
sv
and the Allies that reflects the relationship
between the war effort of North Vietnam
and that of South Vietnam and the allies
WE = the war effort of North Vietnam in terms
of committed manpower
3
Boulding, K. E. , "THE PARAMETERS OF POLITICS," University of






(2) WE = we + r WE
nv nv nv sv
represent the war effort of North Vietnam where
WE = the war effort of North Vietnam
in terms of committed manpower
we = the minimal amount of North Vietnamese
nv




= the reaction coefficient of North Vietnam
that reflects the relationship between the
war effort of South Vietnam and the allies
and that of North Vietnam
WE = the war effort of South Vietnam in terms
sv
of committed manpower
it can be seen that an equilibrium solution for WE exists
u svwhen
(3) WE = we + r we
sv sv sv nv
1 - r r
sv nv
With the knowledge of the goals and objectives of both participants, it
is justifiable to hypothesize that an increase in the reaction coefficient
of either party only serves to provoke a greater WE and consequently
an escalation in the war. Moreover, if the proposition that an upper
bound exists for the war effort of both participants is accepted, it can
be graphically illustrated (see Appendix L) that North Vietnam can easily
adjust its reaction coefficient in accord with its guerrilla tactics to
escalate and deescalate the war at will and thereby extend the war
indefinitely without reception of a clear cut military defeat.
Because of this ability of North Vietnam, present United
States and South Vietnamese war objectives appear to be primarily
15

concerned with the stabilization of the present South Vietnamese govern-
ment and military forces. The United States, faced with domestic
turmoil/ can ill afford to continue the massive war effort of the past
five years. With the current program of "Vietnamization," major efforts
are being made to reduce and redirect the United States commitment of
men and material. Although a decisive military victory has not been
achieved, the United States appears satisfied that the initial cause for
intervention, fear of a Communist takeover in South Vietnam, has been
eliminated. Just how strongly this United States objective coincides
with that of the South Vietnamese government remains to be seen.
Although the present South Vietnamese government appears to have a
strong political and military power base from which to operate, it remains
unknown exactly how it will operate in the absence of a large United
States military presence.
Moreover, it is doubtful that the Communists will relinquish their
original goal of assuming power in South Vietnam. Badly mauled and
decimated by superior Allied firepower, the Communists have been unable
to obtain a decisive military victory as was the case against the French.
They appear content to prolong the war as long as necessary, moving
freely from escalation to deescalation as the situation requires.
16

IV. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY
With this present status of the war, it is imperative that the
economy of South Vietnam become a viable and self sustaining
4
mechanism. Moreover, the South Vietnamese economy presents itself
as a welcome operative into which future United States aid may be
directed without the manpower commitment required for the military
effort
.
To begin such an effort, however, an understanding is necessary
of the South Vietnamese economy both prior to the war and as it exists
today.
Prior to the large scale United States military commitment to
Vietnam in 1965 and the subsequent intensification of the war, the
economy of South Vietnam was almost entirely dependent on agriculture;
in fact, United Nations 1959 statistics showed that a little under one
third of the gross domestic product was furnished by agriculture and
fisheries. Predominant agricultural products were rice and rubber and
comprised between 85 and 92 per cent of the South Vietnamese exports
from 1956 to 1964. Other important crops including maize, sugar, fats
and oils, tobacco, coffee and tea also formed part of the agricultural
4
Lilienthal, p. 321.
United Nations, Toward the Economic Development of the
Republic of Vietnam
, p. 43, United Nations, 1959.
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contribution to the national income, though on a smaller scale. Yet
another important agricultural asset of the South Vietnamese economy
were the forests. About one-third of the land area was under a forest
cover that provided a source of building materials, secondary forest
products, and, potentially, of industrial products which until that time
had been imported.
In regard to industry, the partition of Vietnam in 1954 left the
tobacco, alcohol, soft drink, match, and sugar industries in the South.
In addition, some new light industries
—
paper, glass, textiles, and
cement — were created in the South to fill the vacuum caused by the
termination of trade with the North. Because the country did not appear
to have the resources necessary for massive industrial development,
efforts to promote industry were based on a clear understanding of the
agricultural basis of the economy. Consequently, the most promising
light industries appeared to be those that processed local agricultural
and forest products.
Prior to the current war, national income figures showed that
commerce was an important element of the gross domestic product
ranking just behind agriculture and fisheries. Although a United Nations
study claimed that port facilities, road networks, and inland waterways
could be described as distinctly good, there was evidence of decay in





vital element of the transport system, yet, due to lack of maintenance,
inland waterways had silted up considerably and many junks had fallen
into disrepair. Rail traffic was also in jeopardy due to maintenance
problems and it was considered imperative to improve and repair the
national highways in order to decrease the high cost of transportation.
With respect to manpower, the Vietnamese economy was marked
by a chronically inadequate utilization of manpower resources. In
normal times, this took the form of under employment and low producti-
vity of labor rather than that of outright unemployment. In addition, the
labor force was in general poorly educated and lacked useful skills.
Moreover, as a result of the war with the French, many rural Vietnamese
had left their farms to seek refuge in the cities and towns, particularly
Saigon. This created a refugee problem of considerable consequence
with resultant problems existing in housing, health, welfare, and
education. Government and other social programs had considerable
distances to travel before these obstacles could be considered as
overcome.
It is difficult to make a true assessment of the South Vietnamese
economy at this time. Certainly, some sectors of the economy have
boomed due to massive United States aid but others have declined badly
and show little hope of making a strong revival.
Agricultural production in the South, a mainstay of the economy,
has been hurt by the increased intensity of the war. Whereas, rice
production probably reached five million tons by 1963, it has subsequently
19

declined, and increased imports of rice have been required. Hopeful
observers, however, point to signs that possibly forecast a dramatic
comeback in rice production. This expected comeback is due primarily
to mechanization which has enabled several thousand farmers in the
Mekong delta to double their output of rice and vegetables. Rubber
production, however, has been hurt badly by the exodus of French
personnel and the intensity of the war. Most of the rubber plantations
have been destroyed or badly neglected and in the minds of many econo-
mists should only be rehabilitated and expanded if the declining market
7
for Vietnamese rubber stages a strong reversal.
Industrial production in the South has floundered. Prior to the
war, attempts had been made to create new industries dependent on
forestry and agricultural products. Due to the intensity of the war,
these efforts have met with only limited success. Consequently, the
country has continued to be dependent on those consumer-oriented
industries that were left by the partition in 1954. An exception to this
is the textile industry which has become the single biggest industry
even though textile imports increased tenfold between 1966 and 1968.
Shops, restaurants, hotels, real estate interests, construction, and
other service industries have boomed, yet will undoubtedly suffer severe
losses as the American troop commitment declines.
7
Haviland, H. F. Jr. , Vietnam After the War: Peacekeeping and
Rehabilitation
, p. 8-26, Brookings Institution, 1968.
20

The transportation system of South Vietnam is creaking badly. The
average truck has only a life expectancy of 10,000 miles due to the poor
condition of highways. Approximately 70 per cent of the railway system
is out of business even though the amount of cargo shipped has increased
o
in the period from 1964 to 1967. Inland waterways have continued to
decline due to lack of proper maintenance. Exceptions to this dismal
picture are the excellent port facilities and airfields which have been
constructed for military purposes. Conversion to non-military use should
be a fairly easy task, thus providing important assets to bolster the
South Vietnamese economy.
The manpower problem continues to be one of the most serious
problems confronting the economy of South Vietnam. Refugees have left
the farms en masse and moved to the relative security of the cities.
This has created unemployment problems and has considerably strained
the available health and educational resources. Inadequate methods of
food distribution and a lack of sufficient housing have compounded the
problem and have resulted in the economic dependence of a large segment
of the population on government welfare.
g






In formulating a model of the South Vietnamese economy, it is
practical to view the economy as comprised of five independent sectors,
each expressed as a function of particular political and economic vari-













5., government non-defense services
The rationale employed in partitioning the economy of South Vietnam
in this manner is rather practical and straightforward. Given the histori-
cal economic composition of South Vietnam, the agricultural output,
industrial output, and transportation capacity are selected as measures
to represent the traditional leading economic sectors of South Vietnam —
agriculture, industry, and commerce. The remaining two sectors are
selected in the following manner. During the period of interest to this
paper, South Vietnam experienced almost continuous warfare marked by
substantial increases in the magnitude and intensity of the conflict.
Because of the prolonged duration of the conflict, the survival of South
Vietnam as a nation state and an economic entity became interlinked
with the ability and capacity of the government to mount a successful
war effort. Likewise, due in part to the events of this period, the govern-
ment was forced to assume a more active and more extensive role in
22

providing a greater amount of services to its citizens. Improvements in
such diverse areas as education, medical care, housing, refugee
resettlement, etc., were only some of the necessary requirements placed
on the government. Therefore, because of these circumstances the war
effort and the non-defense government services are viewed as repre-
senting vitally important segments of the South Vietnamese economy.
A. WAR EFFORT
For the purpose of this paper, the war effort of South Vietnam is
expressed in terms of direct manpower commitment to the war and is
interpreted to be synonymous with the size of the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (this information can be found in Appendix A) . Only the
ARVN is considered vice other military services because of the relative
size of the other services and their relative value to the defense posture
of South Vietnam. Moreover, in accord with the formulation of independ-
ent sectors, the manpower utilized in the Regional and Popular Forces
are also disregarded because of their militia or quasi-military status and
their subsequent contributions to other sectors of the economy.
Since one of the expressed purposes of this paper is to examine
the effect of a political variable on individual economic sectors, it is
necessary to formulate a measure to represent the political stability of
South Vietnam. This is accomplished in the following manner. For each
of the years in question an analysis is made, using the New York Times
Index as a reference, to determine the number and type of politically
23

significant events occurring in South Vietnam. The Index is used for this
purpose because it reports only major political occurrences, thereby
reducing a priori the universal set of politically significant events.
Events ranging from coup d'etats and assassinations to student riots
and arrests of prominent Buddhists are examined to ascertain their poli-
tical importance (Appendix B contains a listing of these significant
events). Having identified these events, each event is assigned a
value of +1.0 if the event apparently strengthened the position of the
government or a -1.0 if the event implied a deterioration of the govern-
ment's position. Equal weighting is accomplished by taking the algebraic
sum of values for each year and is used because of the seeming impossi-
bility of determining whether the long or short term political significance
of one event would outweigh the political significance of another.
Having established these units of measure, the war effort is
expressed as follows:
(1) WE =B +B,P +B WE +B WE +B„NWE
sv o 1 sv 2 nv 3 us 4 us
where:
WE = the war effort of South Vietnam measured
sv
in terms of committed manpower
P =the political stability of South Vietnam
sv
WE =the war effort of North Vietnam measured
nv
in terms of committed manpower
WE =the war effort of the United States measured
us
in terms of committed manpower
NWE =the non-war effort of the United States
measured in terms of economic aid
expressed in United States dollars.
24

These specific variables are included to determine if a linear
relationship exists between the political and military situation in South
Vietnam and the nation's ability to mount a significant defense effort.
In particular, the political stability of South Vietnam is included
as an independent variable to determine if the often chaotic political
atmosphere has any statistical effect on the nation's war effort.
The war efforts of North Vietnam and the United States are also
included as independent variables to determine whether the size of the
Communist forces operating in the South and the number of United States
personnel committed has any statistically significant effect on the South
Vietnamese war effort (listings of the North Vietnamese and United States
war efforts can be found in Appendices C and D respectively).
Lastly, the non-war effort of the United States is included to
ascertain the effect of the massive amount of United States supplied
economic aid on the South Vietnamese war effort (this data can be found
in Appendix E) . This is of interest because it is felt that the ability of
the South Vietnamese government to conscript workers for military service
is dependent on the amount of economic aid received from outside
sources, primarily the United States. Without such aid, significant
South Vietnamese mobilization is believed impossible.
B. SOUTH VIETNAMESE AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
An investigation of the South Vietnamese agricultural output
necessitates the formulation of a single quantitative measure of the total
25

annual South Vietnamese agricultural output. This is accomplished by
selecting those crops, livestock, and timber production of primary
importance to the South Vietnamese economy. This type of data,
measured in such non-commensurable units as metric tons, thousands
of head, etc. , is readily available in the United Nations Statistical
Yearbooks of Asia and the Far East and in the Vietnam Statistical Year-
books published by the Bureau of Statistics in Saigon. The method used
to combine these non-commensurable terms into a singular quantitative
measure is to convert each item into its monetary worth for each specific
year. Problems arise, however, in attempting to determine the South
Vietnamese prices for specific crops and other items during the period
of interest. Because of this, resort is made to the use of New York
wholesale prices for the items and years in question. Whereas, some
of these prices are undoubtedly inflated due to various economic price
barriers, it is felt that the inflation can be largely disregarded since as
seen below the total value of the agricultural output is structured as
dependent on the amount of United States economic aid. Overpricing
the worth of the agricultural sector is thus more desirable than under-
pricing in order to attain a more reasonable perspective with this parti-
cular independent variable.
Having attained the worth of specific agricultural items in United
States dollars, the values are combined to yield a singular dollar value
representative of the annual South Vietnamese agricultural output for the
26

years in question (the data used for this measure can be found in
Appendix F) . This method thus permits the agricultural sector to be
expressed as follows:
(2) A =B +B n P +B WE +B WE + B„NWE +BL +BC BT
sv o 1 sv 2 nv 3 us 4 us 5 av 6 sv
where:
A = the value of the agricultural output of
South Vietnam measured in United States dollars
P = the political stability of South Vietnam
sv
WE = the war effort of North Vietnam measured
in terms of committed manpower
WE = the war effort of the United States measured
in terms of committed manpower
NWE = the non-war effort of the United States
measured in terms of economic aid expressed
in United States dollars
L = the amount of arable land in South Vietnam
measured in terms of hectares
BT = the balance of trade of South Vietnam
sv
measured in United States dollars.
For reasons similar to those used in the analysis of the South
Vietnamese war effort, the political stability, war efforts of North
Vietnam and the United States, and the amount of United States supplied
economic aid are included as independent variables in the agricultural
output sector. In addition, the amount of annually available arable land
is included to determine if the amount of cultivated land has any relation-
ship with the amount of agricultural output (the amount of arable land for
the years in question is listed in Appendix G) . In particular, it is felt
that the establishment of a significant relationship between this variable
27

and this sector might signify advances in agricultural technology.
Lastly, the annual balance of trade for South Vietnam expressed in
U. S. dollars is included in this equation to establish a relationship
between the overall strength of the economy as measured by the balance
of trade and the prime contributing sector of the economy-agriculture
(the balance of trade data used in this analysis is listed in Appendix H)
.
C. INDUSTRY OF SOUTH VIETNAM
With respect to the industrial output sector of the economy, a
situation exists similar to that experienced in the agricultural sector.
A common quantitative measure is again required and developed by
selecting the leading industries of South Vietnam and converting their
output expressed in such non-commensurable units as metric tons,
barrels, etc. , to a dollar value. This method is used again due to the
complete unavailability of South Vietnamese prices for the products in
question. Thus, resort is made to the New York wholesale prices for
the products and years of interest. Once again inflated prices are
undoubtedly used but the logic used in the agricultural sector prevails
thus permitting their use. Having made these unit conversions for each
industrially important product, the values obtained are combined to form
an annual value of the industrial output (this data is located in Appendix I)
thus permitting the industrial sector to be expressed by the following
linear equation:
(3) I = B + B.P + B WE + B,WE + B„NWE + B^BT




I = the industrial output of South Vietnam
sv
measured in terms of United States dollar
value
P = the political stability of South Vietnam
sv
WE = the war effort of North Vietnam measured
nv
in terms of committed manpower
WE = the war effort of the United States measured
in terms of committed manpower
NWE ^ = the non-war effort of the United States
measured in terms of economic aid expressed
in United States dollars
BT = the balance of trade of South Vietnam
sv
measured in United States dollars.
As in previous sectors the political stability, the war efforts of
North Vietnam and the United States, the amount of United States
supplied economic aid, and the balance of trade terms are included in
this equation to determine the existence of statistically significant
relationships between these variables and the industrial sector. Of
particular interest is the determination of relationships between the
quantity of industrial output and the amount of United States supplied
economic aid and the South Vietnamese balance of trade. It is felt that
the establishment of a statistically significant relationship between the
industrial output and the amount of United States supplied economic aid
might indicate worthwhile results of the U. S. economic aid program and
further channels for U. S. commitment. Likewise, the establishment of
a significant relationship between the industrial output and the balance
of trade might indicate an improved status for South Vietnamese industry




D. TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY OF SOUTH VIETNAM
As explained in the introduction, the transportation system of
South Vietnam is composed of several elements — railroads, highways,
inland waterways, and air traffic. In formulating an effective single
measure of this rather diversified sector, the following problem developed.
A lack of sufficient data is available to determine the actual capacity of
the system for the period of this analysis, where the capacity of the
system is interpreted as the amount of cargo or number of passengers
transported per annum. Existing data as provided by the Bureau of
9
Statistics in Saigon, however, only records the amount of cargo and
number of passengers transported via air and rail with no mention made
of highway or inland waterway traffic. Since the amount of air and rail
traffic is judged as inconsequential for the years in question as compared
to the traffic moved on the highway infrastructure and inland waterway
system, the use of this data would provide a biased and incorrect por-
trayal of the South Vietnamese transportation capacity. Thus, resort is
made to ascertain the total number of motor vehicles, military and
civilian, present and in use within the system for each of the years
relevant to this analysis (this information is provided in Appendix J).
The use of this data as a measure of the actual capacity of the trans-
portation system appears correct using the following logic. Unquestion-
ably, the use of the motor vehicle assumed a more important role in the
9




commerce of South Vietnam during the years relevant to this study. As
the use of railroads and the inland waterway system diminished as a
result of the war and disrepair, the average South Vietnamese citizen
became increasingly dependent on the use of the motor vehicle for trans-
portation. Although air traffic has increased dramatically, the accessi-
bility and quantity of air service continued to limit its function to that
of a second rate component. Thus, by determining the total number of
motor vehicles present and in use within South Vietnam, the following
linear equation is formulated for the transportation sector:
(4) T =6+3,? + B WE + B„WE + B„NWE
sv o 1 sv 2 nv 3 us 4 us
where:
T = the transportation capacity of South
Vietnam measured by the number of motor
vehicles present and in use
P = the political stability of South Vietnam
WE = the war effort of North Vietnam measured
nv
in terms of committed manpower
WE = the war effort of the United States measured
us
in terms of committed manpower
NWE = the non-war effort of the United States
us
measured in terms of economic aid
expressed in United States dollars.
Once again the political stability of South Vietnam, the war efforts
of North Vietnam and the United States and the amount of United States
supplied economic aid are utilized as independent variables. Of prime
interest, however, is the determination of statistically significant
relationships between this sector and the war efforts of North Vietnam
31

and the United States. Establishment of such relationships might well
be construed as support for the findings of the Lilienthal study which
saw an improved internal commercial transportation system as a result
of the war.
E. NON-DEFENSE GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES
As a result of the political, military, and social events that
occurred in South Vietnam during the years of interest to this study, a
large and rather complex governmental infrastructure developed. Of
particular interest, however, is not the expanding size of the govern-
ment but rather the enlarged role of the government in the life of the
average citizen. Although the war has proven an economic success to
some South Vietnamese, many have experienced unparalleled hardships.
This fact coupled with a growing awareness of the comforts and standard
of living enjoyed by their war time Allies, notably the Americans, has
increased the demands placed on the government by its citizens. These
demands have taken the form of extensive relief for war victims and
refugees, improved housing and medical care, and improvements in the
quantity and quality of education. In establishing a quantitative measure
of this expanding governmental social activity, use is made of existing
data of the amount of governmental non-defense expenditures, expressed




data can be found in Appendix K) . This permits the formulation of
the following linear equation representing the non-defense activities of
the South Vietnamese government:
(5) S = B + B,P + B„WE + B WE + B„NWE
sv o 1 sv 2 nv 3 us 4 us
where:
S = the total amount of South Vietnamese non-
sv defense government expenditures expressed
in piastres
P = the political stability of South Vietnam
sv
WE = the war effort of North Vietnam expressed
in terms of committed manpower
WE = the war effort of the United States
expressed in terms of committed manpower
NWE = the non-war effort of the United States
measured in terms of economic aid
expressed in United States dollars.
As in the formulation of equations for the other economic sectors
the political stability, the war efforts of North Vietnam and the United
States, and the amount of United States supplied economic aid are
included in the analysis of this sector. Of particular interest, however,
is the determination of a relationship between the amount of govern-
mental non-defense spending and the political stability of the govern-
ment. This is of interest because it is believed that the ability of the
government to expand and provide increased services to its citizens is
interwoven with its ability to maintain a politically stable base from
which to operate. Of secondary interest is the determination of a relation-
ship between this sector and the war effort of North Vietnam, for it is
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hypothesized that the war effort of South Vietnam has a causal effect




VI. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
This chapter describes the method of analysis used in investi-
gating the preceding linear model of the South Vietnamese economy.
The analysis consists of two related steps, the first of which is always
performed
.
A. STEP 1 OF THE ANALYSIS
The first step employed to determine the significance of selected
variables on individual economic sectors consists of multiple stepwise
regression analysis using data for each of the eleven years in question
and the equations formulated above. Each of these equations is of the
form Y = B„ + B..X, + B X + . . . + B X + E, where the regression°1122 nn
coefficient B. for each independent variable X. indicates the relationship1
of that independent variable to the dependent variable Y under the
assumption that other independent variables in the equation are held
constant. This type of regression analysis is often called stepwise
regression, but it is really repeated multiple regression with a decision
rule for the selection of the next variable to be included in the regression.
In this analysis the program is free to select the independent variable
to enter into the regression. The first variable used as an independent
variable is that variable which has the highest correlation with the
dependent variable. The second variable brought into the regression is
that which has the highest partial correlation with the dependent variable
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after allowing for the predictive ability of the first independent variable,
Moreover, 0.01 is the proportion of the sum of squares used to limit
the entering of variables into the regression. Unless the proportion of
the sum of squares attributable to an entering variable is greater than
this value, the variable is not entered.
The results of this analysis are presented in the following format.
An F value for each step of the analysis is provided to indicate the
goodness of fit of the regression plane. This F value makes possible
the testing of the following hypothesis:
H: B = B = B = ... = B =0
o 1 2 n
H.: B ^B. ^B_^ ... ?B /
1 o 1 I n
It can be shown ' that such estimates follow an F distribution
with r and n-p degress of freedom where:
r - the number of independent variables
n = the number of observations
p = the number of unknown parameters, B..
Rejection of the null hypothesis, H , occurs if F > F a
,
o (r,n-p)
This in effect indicates the existence of a linear relationship between
the dependent variable Y and at least one of the independent variables,
Mood, A. M. and Graybill, F. A. , Introduction to the Theory
of Statistics
, p. 353-355, McGraw-Hill Co. , 1963.
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Computed t values are also produced using this type of analysis
to precisely identify the independent variables of significance in the
regression. This identification process takes the form of testing the
following null hypothesis:






H : B. ^ i = 1, . .
.
, r .
The appropriate test statistic for this identification has been shown to be
12
the t statistic where rejection of the null hypothesis occurs if
t
-
t (l- o/2) fo-p)'
or if
* ^(1-0/2) (n-p)-
Rejection of the null hypothesis for specific coefficients indicates the
existence of a linear relationship between the dependent variable Y and
independent variable associated with that specific coefficient.
Furthermore, this method also produces a value for the coefficient
of multiple correlation that supports the results of the aforementioned F
statistic. A relatively high value for this coefficient indicates in general
the existence of a relationship between the dependent variable Y and at
least one of the independent variables X., whereas a low value implies
no such relationship.
12
Ostle, B., Statistics in Research




In addition, a correlation matrix is computed and is composed of
the correlation coefficients of individual pairs of variables assuming
other variables are held constant.
B. STEP 2 OF THE ANALYSIS
The second step of the data analysis is performed only when high
values appear in the correlation matrix between the dependent variable
and an independent variable.
When the computed F and t statistics prove statistically
insignificant in the stepwise regression analysis, attention is focused
on the values of the correlation matrix. The existence of relatively
high correlation values between the dependent and individual independ-
ent variables is interpreted as indicating possible statistically signifi-
cant linear relationships. To investigate these possible relationships,
the stepwise multiple regression is repeated. However, this time the
independent variables under investigation are forced into the regression





The preceding analysis was performed using the computer routine
for stepwise multiple regression analysis (STEPR) as found in STATLIB
of the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School Computer Center. This chapter
presents the results of this analysis and in Tables I through X presents
that portion of data pertinent to this paper.
A. WAR EFFORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
The initial analytical results for the war effort sector reveal the
existence of a linear relationship between the committed manpower of
South Vietnam and at least one of the following independent variables —
the political stability of South Vietnam, the committed manpower of
North Vietnam, the committed manpower of the United States, and the
amount of United States economic aid. The computed F value for the
analysis is 71.965 which is highly significant at the a =0.01 level
with r = 4 and n-p = 6 degrees of freedom. Moreover, this result is
reinforced by the high value of the multiple correlation coefficient,
0.943. In particular, the analysis introduces only one independent
variable into the regression. This variable is the committed manpower
of North Vietnam which is significant at the a = 0.01 level with 6




Inspection of the correlation matrix (see Table I), however, reveals
relatively high vah. s of correlation between the committed manpower of
South Vietnam and the following independent variables — committed man-
power of the United States and the amount of U. S. economic aid.
Performance of additional stepwise regressions in which these variables
are forced to enter the regression reveal the significance of the committed
manpower of the United States and the amount of U. S. economic aid
terms at the a = 0.01 level with t values of 4. 937 and 5. 139
respectively (see Table II).
B. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Analysis of the agricultural sector presents an interesting result —
the agricultural output of South Vietnam is not linearly related in a
statistically significant manner to any of the independent variables.
Five independent variables, the political stability of South Vietnam,
committed manpower of the United States, committed manpower of North
Vietnam, the amount of United States economic aid, and the South
Vietnamese balance of trade, are introduced into the regression but only
succeed in reducing the sum of squares by 49.1% while establishing an
F value of .965 which is insignificant at the a = 0.05 level, with
r = 6 and n-p = 4 degrees of freedom. The small value of 0.389 for the
coefficient of multiple correlation and the small t-values (see Table IV)
confirm these results
.

























1.00000 -0.00665 0.24483 0.08293 -0.08193
1.00000 0.91741 0.90202 0.94278
0.91741 1.00000 0.95392 0.85457
0.90202 0.95392 1.00000 0.86363
1.00000












4.937 (when forced into regression) 6
5.139 (when forced into regression) 6
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C. INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Analysis of the industrial sector results in an F value of 13.510
which is significant at the a- 0.05 level with r = 5 and n-p = 5
degrees of freedom. This indicates the existence of a linear relation-
ship between the industrial output of South Vietnam and at least one of
the following independent variables — the political stability of South
Vietnam, the committed manpower of the United States, the committed
manpower of North Vietnam, the amount of United States economic aid,
and the South Vietnamese balance of trade. In addition, this result is
confirmed by the relatively high value of the multiple correlation
coefficient, 0.864. In particular, the analysis introduces two variables
into the regression, the political stability of South Vietnam and the
committed manpower of North Vietnam with t values of -3.076 and 4.170
respectively. The committed manpower of North Vietnam is significant
at the ct= 0.01 level whereas the political stability of South Vietnam
is significant at the a =0.05 level. Together, the inclusion of these
two variables succeeds in reducing 77.2% of the sum of squares.
Although the values obtained in the correlation matrix (see
Table V) do not appear indicative of significant relationships between
the industrial output and the remaining independent variables, the second
stage of analysis is performed to force the amount of United States
economic aid term into the regression. When this is performed, the
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relationship between the industrial output and the amount of United States
economic aid at the a =0.05 level. Attempts to force other variables
into the regression fail to establish significant linear relationships.
D. TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY OF SOUTH VIETNAM
The analysis of the transportation sector reveals a linear relation-
ship between the transportation capacity of South Vietnam and the com-
mitted manpower of North Vietnam. The F value of 11.170 is significant
at the a =0.05 level with r = 4 and n-p = 6 degrees of freedom and
is confirmed by a relatively high value of 0.885 for the multiple cor-
relation coefficient. In particular, the committed manpower of North
Vietnam with a computed t-value of 5.646 is significant at the <* =0.01
level.
Inspection of the correlation matrix (see Table VII), however,
reveals relatively high values of correlation between the transportation
capacity and the committed manpower of the United States and the amount
of United States economic aid. Therefore, the second stage of analysis
is performed to investigate whether a statistically significant linear
relationship exists between the transportation capacity of South Vietnam
and these terms. The results of forcing these two independent variables
into the regression in separate regression analyses (see Table VIII) indi-
cates that both the committed manpower of the United States and the




TABLE VII CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR
P WE WE NWE T
sv nv us us sv
P 1.00000 -0.00665 0.24483 0.08293 -0.00141
sv
1.00000 0.91741 0.90202 0.88308
0.91741 1.00000 0.95392 0.87848
0.90202 0.95392 1.00000 0.86852













TABLE VIII t-VALUES FOR TRANSPORTATION SECTOR









E. NON-DEFENSE GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Results obtained from the analysis of the non-defense government
services sector indicate the existence of a significant linear relationship
between this sector and at least one of three independent variables --the
committed manpower of the United States , the committed manpower of
North Vietnam, and the amount of United States economic aid. The
computed F value of 14.207 is significant at the a =0.01 level with
r = 4 and n-p = 6 degrees of freedom. This statistical significance is
supported by the relatively high value of 0.908 for the multiple cor-
relation coefficient. In particular, the analysis introduces the afore-
mentioned independent variables into the regression and accounts for
85.9% of the sum of squares. Of these three variables, t values reveal
(see Table X) that only the committed manpower of the United States is
significant at the a =0.01 level in the first step of the analysis.
However, inspection of the correlation matrix (see Table LX)
reveals relatively high degrees of correlation between the transportation
capacity and the committed manpower of North Vietnam and the amount
of United States economic aid. For this reason, the second stage of the
analysis is performed forcing these independent variables into separate
regression analyses. The results (see Table X) indicate the establish-
ment of significant linear relationships at the a =0.01 level between
the transportation capacity and the committed manpower of North Vietnam
and the amount of United States economic aid respectively.
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TABLE IX CORRELATION MATRIX FOR NON-DEFENSE
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES SECTOR
WE WE NWE
sv nv us us sv
p
sv
1.00000 -0.00665 0.24483 0.08293 0.19801
WE
nv
-0.00665 1.00000 0.91741 0.90202 0.88877
WE
us
0.24483 0.91741 1.00000 0.95382 0.90841
NWE
us
0.08293 0.90202 0.95392 1.00000 0.84091
S 0.19801 0.88877 0.90841 0.84091 1.00000
sv

















VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The aforementioned results indicate the existence of linear relation-
ships between dependent variables representing the sectors of the South
Vietnamese economy and particular independent political and economic
variables. Whereas regression analysis maintains a form of predictive
ability, the results are not interpreted for that purpose. To attempt
accurate predictions on such a complex subject as the effect of war on
an economy using the hindsight of historical data would appear unsup-
portable at best. Therefore, the results are interpreted merely to estab-
lish the existence of relationships between the economic sectors of
South Vietnam and specific variables of importance in order to ascertain
if the economy has been affected by these variables. The above results
permit the following conclusions:
A. WAR EFFORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Whereas the initial analysis includes only one term in the
regression (the committed manpower of North Vietnam), it is apparent
that a strong relationship exists between the committed manpower of
South Vietnam and the committed manpower of North Vietnam. This result
seems quite logical and lends support to the belief that military escala-
tion by one opponent leads to increased escalation by the other. In
particular, this study demonstrates that the enlargement of the South
Vietnamese war effort is affected in a statistically significant manner
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by the buildup of Communist forces in the South. It also demonstrates
that linear relationships exist between the committed manpower of South
Vietnam and the committed manpower of the United States and the amount
of United States economic aid. In retrospect, the existence of these
relationships is considered as support for the tenet that the enlargement
of the war effort of South Vietnam would not have been as great without
the massive amount of U. S. aid in terms of both personnel and dollars.
Finally, this study suggests that the political stability of South
Vietnam as defined in this study may not be a significant contributing
factor to the enlargement of the war effort. This is interpreted as imply-
ing that the war effort of South Vietnam is primarily affected by the large
scale United States presence and the need to counteract the war effort
of North Vietnam.
B. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Results of the analysis of the agricultural sector indicate that the
agricultural production of South Vietnam is linearly unrelated to the vari-
ables under investigation. This is interpreted as implying that although
the output of specific crops has declined, resulting in some importation,
that in general agriculture is able to maintain a fairly stable level of
production. Although the war efforts of North Vietnam and the United
States are highly suspect as being detrimental to agricultural production,
these suspicions are statistically unconfirmed. Of particular interest,
however, is the lack of a relationship between agricultural production
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and the amount of United States supplied economic aid. This is inter-
preted as support of the fact that much of the United States aid has been
military and consumer oriented. Continued lack of substantial aid for
agriculture on the part of the United States may have serious future
consequences on this predominant sector of the South Vietnamese
economy. Furthermore, the lack of any statistically significant relation-
ship between the agricultural production and the political stability of the
government is interpreted as providing an insight into the relationship
of Saigon to the rural populace. That the agricultural production remains
statistically unaffected by the oftentimes chaotic political events
occurring in Saigon suggests that in a like manner the average South
Vietnamese farmer remains economically unaffected.
C. INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Analysis of the industrial sector of the economy shows that a
statistically significant relationship exists between the industrial out-
put of South Vietnam and three independent variables — the political
stability of the government, the war effort of North Vietnam, and the
amount of United States supplied economic aid.
The establishment of a linear relationship between the industrial
output and the war effort of North Vietnam and the political stability of
the government is of particular interest because of the nature of the
relationship. The results of the analysis indicate that as the political
situation deteriorates and the war effort of North Vietnam increases,
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the industrial output improves. This relationship is interpreted
as indicating that the conflict has in general no serious detrimental
effects on South Vietnam's fledgling industry during the years of this
study. Whether this is related to the infantile nature of South Vietnam's
industrial development is unconfirmed. Although the conflict may have
prevented rapid industrial advances, at least complete industrial progress
was not brought to a halt. This result, however, demonstrates once again
the ability of the economy to operate without benefit of a politically
favorable atmosphere.
This ability is even more noticeable when the variable representing
the amount of United States supplied economic aid is forced into the
regression. The resultant of this analysis indicates the existence of a
linear relationship between industrial output and the amount of United
States economic aid and the political stability of South Vietnam. Again
the results indicate that as the political situation deteriorates and the
amount of United States supplied economic aid increases, the
industrial output improves. Thus, it appears that the amount of United
States economic aid has a more contributing effect on this sector of
the economy than the stability of the government.
D. TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY OF SOUTH VIETNAM
The regression analysis performed on the transportation sector
clearly indicates the existence of statistically significant relationships
between the transportation capacity of South Vietnam and the war efforts
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of North Vietnam and the United States and the amount of United States
supplied economic aid. The interpretation of these results is that in
general the transportation capacity of South Vietnam as defined in this
paper has increased markedly as a result of the conflict. The escalation
of the war by North Vietnam and the United States, coupled with increased
United States economic aid , has greatly increased the transportation
capacity of South Vietnam. In particular, since the data used for the
transportation capacity includes both civilian and military motor vehicles,
these results illustrate the impact of military escalation on this sector
13
of the economy. These results support the beliefs of Liiienthal ' and
14
Dacy who feel that a much improved internal transportation capacity
will be available in postwar Vietnam if a successful transition from
military to civilian use can be accomplished.
E. GOVERNMENTAL NOM-DEFENSE EXPENDITURES,
The results obtained from the analysis of the governmental non-
defense services sector clearly indicate the existence of linear relation-
ships between the amount of governmental non-defense expenditures
and the following independent variables — the committed manpower of
North Vietnam, the committed manpower of the United States, and the




Dacy, D. C, Availability of Goods in South Vietnam from
1964 through 1967, p. 10-12, Institute for Defense Analyses , 1969.
53

these relationships indicates that the war effort of North Vietnam has a
positive effect on the need for the South Vietnamese government to pro-
vide increased social services. This is anticipated because throughout
the period of this study an escalation of the conflict by the North Viet-
namese only served to increase the hardships of the populace and thereby
enlarge the role of the government with respect to services of this type.
Interestingly, the war effort of the United States and the amount of
United States supplied economic aid also increased and are logically
interpreted as indicating support for the government both militarily and
in its role of supplying services such as improved medical care, education,
housing, and relief for war refugees.
F. GENERAL COMMENTS AND EXTENSIONS
The nature and results of these effects suggest the large-scale
dependence of the Vietnamese economy on the military conflict and the
presence of the United States in Southeast Asia. The removal of either
of these two forces may have even more significant and lasting effects
on the economy than their presence. It is with this knowledge that
steps should be taken to promote the economy of South Vietnam and to
develop a self-supporting nation capable of providing political and
economic leadership to Southeast Asia.
In this thesis the effects of the war and other political
and economic variables on the South Vietnamese economy have been
established at the cost of some simplification. The author does not
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imply, however, any deficiency in the mathematical model. Further
investigation of the South Vietnamese economy using this type of a model
is strongly encouraged. However, it is felt that future research should
restrict itself to a detailed study of an individual economic sector
rather than attempt to analyze the entire economy. Detailed analysis
of a specific sector, notably agriculture, would prove of considerable
value in determining the future role of specific crops such as rice and




Growth of the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam
As cited in reference 10, these figures were related to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations by Secretary of State William P. Rogers





























Politically Significant Events in South Vietnam, 1957-1967
The following politically significant events occurred in the period
1957 through 1967 and were determined from analysis of reference 16.
The values preceding the date of the event signify either an event that
strengthened the government of South Vietnam (+1.0) or an event that
weakened the government of South Vietnam (-1.0). The total represents
the algebraic sum of these values and is indicative of the annual


















unsuccessful assassination attempt on
President Ngo Dinh Diem.
National Bank of South Vietnam claims that
country is physically secure for the first
time in fifteen years.
President Ngo Dinh Diem reports approval for
twelve industrial projects in a drive to spur
economic development.
President Ngo Dinh Diem reports mounting
Communist-inspired terrorist activities.
the press expresses concern over mounting
terrorist activities.
30,000 stage anti-Communist rally at Bienhoa
following terrorist attacks.
President Diem's party wins majority of



































South Vietnamese press reports an increase
of Communist terrorism.
eighteen South Vietnamese notables, including
ten ex-Ministers ask President Diem to
liberalize his regime.
five battalions of troops under the leadership of
Col. Nguyen Chanh Thi stage a bloody predawn
uprising; they claim Diem's ouster.
loyal South Vietnamese troops are called to
Saigon.
President Diem proclaims an end to the coup
attempt.
Communist activities increase in the wake of
the unsuccessful coup attempt.
non-Communist opposition grows against Diem's
dictatorial powers and reported family
profiteering
.
Communists openly threaten villagers who vote
for Diem in forthcoming elections.
Saigon press reports increased pre-election
Communist led terrorism.
President Diem and Vice-President Nguyen NgocTho
re-elected with 78% of the vote.
President Diem orders a national state of
emergency over rising terrorist activities.
United States confirms accords to send increased
military aid and initial U.S. military advisors.
President Diem under U. S. pressure begins
governmental reforms in politically tense Saigon.
Dr. Pham Huy Co, titular leader of the Free






-1.0 Feb. 27 two military planes, flown by dissident airmen,
bomb and strafe the Presidential Palace.
-1.0 Mar. 1 Assembly committee reports widespread Air Force
support for bombing of Presidential Palace.
+1.0 Mar. 5 Air Force stages loyalty demonstration.
+ 1.0 May 17 many military officers, civilians, and opposition
politicians arrested after Diem directed investi-
gation of February bombing incident*
-1.0 Aug. 12 austere security measures in effect in Saigon
following press reports of hinted military coup.
-1.0 Aug. 17 Saigon press reports growing black market





-1.0 May 10 seven Buddhist demonstrators killed in Hue riots
when police break up demonstration against
Diem's orders barring flying of flags and pro-
cessions on Buddha's birthday.
-1.0 May 22 over 500 Buddhists parade in Saigon to condemn
Hue incident.
-1.0 May 31 government tension increases following Buddhist
protest for religious equality in front of the
National Assembly."
-1.0 June 5 large Buddhist demonstrations in Hue halted
after troops use tear gas .
-1.0 June 9 Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu labels Buddhists as
Communist dupes.
-1.0 June 16 10,000 Buddhists clash with police in Saigon.
-1.0 July 3 reported rumors of a military coup.
+ 1.0 July 10 President Kennedy in a personal message to Diem
confirms U. S. support for his government.
-1.0 July 17 police clash with Buddhists in Saigon in most
violent demonstration of current crisis.
+ 1.0 July 24 ARVN veterans stage pro-government rally in
Saigon.












5,000 Buddhists demonstrate in Saigon calling
for religious equality.
Catholics in Saigon claim that Diem is
authoritarian.
Hue and Nha Trang placed under martial law
following Buddhist immolations.
47 Hue University faculty members resign and
call for Diem's ouster.
police invade Buddhist pagodas in Saigon and
arrest 100 Buddhist monks.
Diem orders nation placed under martial law.
U. S. charges that government is failing to seek
reconciliation with Buddhists.
-1.0 Aug. 23 continuation of mass arrests of Buddhists and
opposition political leaders.
anti-U. S. and student unrest increases.
Diem shuts Saigon University and all public
and private secondary schools.
over 600 students arrested in Saigon.
Cambodia severs diplomatic ties over
government policy towards Buddhists.
30,000-40,000 attend pro-government rallies
in Saigon.
government arrests 800 high school students
during protest demonstration in Saigon.
1,000 high school students arrested in Cholon
section of Saigon after anti-government
demonstrations
.
U. S. Ambassador Lodge tells Diem that
Ngo Dinh Nhu must be relieved as Chief of State.
government rushes troops to Saigon against
threatened student demonstrations.
troops maintain control of Saigon.
U. S. quietly suspends aid in form of commercial















-1.0 Nov. 2 government falls in quick military coup.
+ 1.0 Nov. 2 U. S. welcomes coup under leadership of
Gen. Duong Van Minh.
-1.0 Nov. 3 President Diem and Chief of State Nhu reported
murdered
.
-1.0 Nov. 3 over internal protest coups leaders appoint
Nguyen Ngoc Tho as Premier.
U. S. recognizes the new regime.







+ 1.0 Jan. 17 government closes 9 newspapers in Saigon,
charging violation of internal security.
-1.0 Jan. 30 Minh is overthrown by Maj . Gen Nguyen Khanh;
aim of coup is to ban South Vietnam's
neutralization.
-1.0 Feb. 5 1,000 students demonstrate in Saigon for return
of Duong Van Minh.
-1.0 Mar. 2 Khanh reveals a French-led plot to assassinate
him.
+ 1.0 Mar. 23 Military Revolutionary Council unanimously
votes confidence in Khanh.
-1.0 May 5 Saigon taxi drivers threaten demonstrations
against U. S. involvement after U. S. personnel
linked to murder of a taxi driver.
+ 1.0 May 17 Khanh grants full religious freedom for the
Buddhists.
+ 1.0 May 28 Khanh frees 686 political prisoners.
-1.0 June 8 35 , 000 Catholics demonstrate against
government favoritism for Buddhists.
-1.0 July 21 students lead anti-French demonstrations in
Saigon.
-1.0 Aug. 9 students surround Khanh' s car in Hue demanding
Buddhist rights
.




-1.0 Aug. 22 several hundred students denounce Khanh's
dictatorship.
-1.0 Aug. 23 2,000 students lead anti-government demon-
stration in Saigon.
-1.0 Aug. 25 anti-government demonstrations erupt in major
cities.
-1.0 Aug. 26 Military Revolutionary Council withdraws con-
stitution says it will elect a new head of state
and then disband.
-1.0 Aug. 27 Khanh reports the failure of the Council to elect
a new head of state.
Buddhists riot against Catholics in major cities.
triumvirate of Minh, Khanh, and Tran Thien Khiem
formed; Khanh is appointed caretaker premier at
U. S. insistence.
severe rioting occurs against the government
in Saigon.
Nguyen Xuan Oanh named acting premier for two
months; Khanh has reportedly suffered a complete
physical and mental breakdown.
Khanh returns as premier; students pledge support
for the triumvirate.
Nguyen Ton Hoan, Dai Viet leader, resigns as
First Deputy Premier claiming that he can't
work with Khanh
.
+ 1.0 Sept. 4 Khanh dissolves the triumvirate; Minh becomes
the new Chief of State.
Khanh lifts press censorship.
Brig. Gen Lam Van Phat leads a bloodless coup
in Saigon.
forces loyal to Khanh regain control of the
government.
Khanh institutes sweeping military changes in
the command structure.
rumors abound of large scale anti-government
demonstrations
.
National High Council ordered into effect to
draw up a new Constitution.
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-1.0 Aug. 27
+ 1.0 Aug. 28
-1.0 Aug. 28
-1.0 Aug. 29




+ 1.0 Sept. 10
-1.0 Sept. 11
+ 1.0 Sept. 14
+ 1.0 Sept. 19
-1.0 Oct. 2
+ 1.0 Oct. 21

+ 1.0 Oct. 25 Council elects elder statesman PhanKhac Suu
as Chief of State after rejecting Minn.
-1.0 Oct. 26 Khanh resigns as Premier.
+ 1.0 Oct. 30 Suu names Tran Van Huong as Premier.
-1.0 Nov. 6 Council Chairman, Nguyen Xuan Chu resigns,
critical of the new civilian government.
-1.0 Nov. 23 thousands riot against the Huong government.
-1.0 Nov. 27 Huong declares national state of emergency.
-1.0 Dec. 20 armed forces purge the National High Council.





-1.0 Jan. 4 thousands of anti-government demonstrators
clash with police in Saigon.
-1.0 Jan. 9 1,000 s.udents demonstrate against the
government in Saigon.
+ 1.0 Jan. 10 military leaders agree to restore Huong's
civilian government.
-1.0 Jan. 12 major cities paralyzed by a general strike
called by Buddhists.
-1.0 Jan. 15 Buddhists lead anti-<jovernment demonstrations
in major cities.
-1.0 Jan. 18 2,000 demonstrate in Hue demanding Huong's
ouster.
-1.0 Jan 23. Buddhists attack U. S. I. S. library in Saigon.
-1.0 Jan. 24 Buddhists attack U. S. I. S. library in Hue.
-1.0 Jan. 25 2,000 demonstrate against the government in Hue
-1.0 Jan. 26 15,000 Buddhist sympathizers protest in Hue.
+1.0 Jan. 27 Armed Forces Council ousts Huong and Suu;
Khanh becomes the new Chief of State.
+1.0 Jan. 28 Buddhist pledge support for Khanh.
+1.0 Feb. 16 Phan Huy Quat appointed as new Premier.




-1.0 Feb. 19 Marine and ARVN units overthrow Khanh;
Lt. Gen. Tran Thiem Khiem takes over as
Chief of State.
+ 1.0 Feb. 20 forces loyal to Khanh regain control and call
on the dissidents to surrender.
-1.0 Feb. 21 Armed Forces Council ousts Khanh.
+ 1.0 Feb. 22 Tran Van Minh replaces Khanh as Chief of State.
-1.0 Apr. 9 rumors of a Navy coup attempt following Saigon
meeting against Radm. Chung Ton Cong.
-1.0 May 7 Armed Forces Council disbands.
-1.0 June 4 Catholics demonstrate against the government
in Saigon.
+ 1.0 June 12 military coup ousts Quat as Premier under the
leadership of Nguyen Van Thieu.
+ 1.0 June 19 Nguyen Cao Ky named as Premier; National
Leadership Committee established with Thieu
as Chairman.
-1.0 Oct. 15 3,000 demonstrate in Hue demanding Thieu'
s
ouster.




+ 1.0 Jan. 16 Ky promises a new Constitution and national
elections in 1967.
reports in Saigon of a rumored coup attempt.
thousands of Buddhists demonstrate against
the government in Saigon.
Buddhists' leaders affirm support for the
government.
Ky pledges a new Constitution within two months.
anti-government student led demonstrations in
Saigon.
demonstrations erupt in Hue.
10,000 demonstrate against the government
in Danang
.




+ 1.0 Mar. 20





-1.0 Apr. 4 3,000 students demonstrate against the
government in Hue.
-1.0 Apr. 10 anti-government, Buddhist military junta formed.
+ 1.0 Apr. 15 Ky concedes to Buddhist demands and pledges
national elections in 3-5 months.
+ 1.0 Apr. 15 20,000 Buddhists hold pro-government rally
in Hue.
Ky promises national elections on August 15.
2,000 hold anti-government protest in Danang.
3,000 Catholics hold a pro-government rally
in Saigon.
Buddhists pledge support for Ky until elections
.
5,000 hold anti-U. S. rally in Saigon.
Ky states intention of remaining in power for
another year.
pro-government troops defeat anti-government
troops and Buddhists in Saigon battle.
3,000 anti-government demonstrators protest
in Hue.
50,000 hold an anti-government strike in Saigon
anti-government demonstrations are held under
Buddhist leadership in Hue. -
_
500 Buddhists demonstrate against the
government in Saigon.
government troops capture Buddhist pagoda in
Danang.
government troops battle dissidents in Danang.
rebels in Danang surrender to government troops
1,000 students hold anti-government
demonstration in Hue.
Buddhists and students sack and burn the
U. S. cultural center in Hue.
2,000 Buddhists demonstrate against U. S.
involvement in Saigon.
20,000 demonstrate against the government
in Saigon.
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+ 1.0 Apr. 16
-1.0 Apr. 16
+ 1.0 Apr. 16
+ 1.0 Apr. 18
-1.0 May 1
+ 1.0 May 7





+ 1.0 May 22
-1.0 May 23


















+ 1.0 June 20
+1.0 Aug. 27
Sept. 12
1,000 students burn the U. S. consulate in Hue.
Ky government adds 10 civilian members.
5,000 Buddhists hold anti-U. S. demonstration
in Hue.
government troops control Buddhists in Hue rally.
15,000 hold a pro-U. S. rally in Saigon.
5,000 hold an anti-government demonstration in
Hue.
Buddhists hold anti-government demonstration
in Saigon.
press reports on the influence of the Hue,
Buddhists element.
South Vietnam forced to devaluate the currency.
government places Hue under martial law.
election preparations occurring smoothly.















+ 1.0 Oct. 2 9
+ 1.0 Oct. 31
+ 1.0 Nov. 5
+ 1.0 Nov. 28
+6
. TOTAL
government discontinues censorship of
political news.
Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky win
election receiving 27% of the total vote.
state of emergency decreed in Danang to avert
Buddhist anti-government demonstrations.
Buddhists hold large anti-government rally in
Danang.
government ban enforced against political
demonstrations in Saigon.
Constituent Assembly votes to confirm election
of Thieu and Ky.
Buddhist demonstration successfully halted in
Saigon.
Thieu inaugurated in incident free ceremony.
Thieu recognizes the legality of moderate Buddhists




Year End Estimates of the War Effort of North Vietnam
The following data of year end operating North Vietnamese and

















Year End Estimates of the War Effort of the United States

















United States Economic Aid to South Vietnam, 1957-1967
This data was relayed to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense

















Agricultural Output of South Vietnam, 1957-1967
This data was obtained by converting the existing data in
references 20, 21, 26, and 27 to monetary values using the existing
prices listed in reference 22.
year value in millions















Arable Land in South Vietnam, 1957-1967
The following information was obtained from reference 21
















South Vietnamese Balance of Trade, 1957-1967
The following information was obtained from reference 21
year balance of trade in















South Vietnamese Industrial Output, 1957-1967
This data was obtained by converting the existing data in
references 20, 21, 26, and 27 to monetary values using the existing
prices listed in reference 24.
S. V. industrial output
















The Transportation Capacity of South Vietnam, 1957-1967
The following information was obtained from reference 21.

















South Vietnamese Non-defense Government Expenditures, 1957-1967
The following information was obtained from reference 27.
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